Abstract-CRAC is an IT-infrastructure-based method for assessing and comparing confidentiality risks of distributed IT systems. The method determines confidentiality risks by taking into account the effects of the leakage of confidential information (e.g. industrial secrets), and the paths that may be followed by different attackers (e.g. insider and outsider). We evaluate its effectiveness by applying it to a real-world outsourcing case.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, most data exchange within and across boundaries of organizations takes place electronically. Exchanged data often contains confidential information, the loss of which could result in economic damage. (We call "confidential data" exactly the data that by business policy should not be disclosed to unauthorized users, e.g. business information and patient data) Good security, on the other hand, is also costly and even the most expensive countermeasures cannot prevent all possible confidentiality incidents. Therefore, one of the goals of security officers is to realize and maintain an IT system which strikes the right balance among security, budget, and system usability. To achieve this, they typically refer to well-established standards and best practices such as ISO 27002 [6] and NIST 800-30 [1] . Assessing IT (confidentiality) risks becomes particularly challenging in the presence of cross-organizational cooperations, e.g. IT outsourcing. As part of the cooperation, organizations typically connect their ITinfrastructures together and they grant access rights to each other's (confidential) information. This network of organizations increases the complexity of the confidentiality risk assessment because one has to deal with a more complex ITinfrastructure and with an extended set of potential threats.
One of the crucial factors influencing the confidentiality risks a company faces is the IT-infrastructure the company (and its outsourcers) employs to store its confidential data. This is intuitively obvious: an encrypted database behind firewalls accessible only via VPN (virtual private network) is less vulnerable than a similar unencrypted database without firewalls protecting it. In general, how and where confidential data is stored has a large impact on its overall security. In spite of the obviousness of this statement, mainstream risk assessment methodologies take into little consideration the ITinfrastructure where confidential data is stored.
Therefore, to make informed decisions on the (security) design of its IT-infrastructure, decision makers need to be able to assess and compare different IT-infrastructures also according to the confidentiality risks. This can only be achieved if risks are assessed consistently for each considered solution. However, the result of typical risk analysis methods cannot be consistently compared with each other if they were carried out by different people. This happens because they are mostly based either on the subjective opinion of the different risk assessor(s) or on event histories. Confidentiality risks are even harder to assess in an inter-subjective (independent of personal judgment) way, because of their non-functional nature and the (typical) lack of logs about past incidents.
To address these problems, we present the Confidentiality Risk Assessment and Comparison (CRAC) method. With the CRAC-method one can assess confidentiality risks by taking into account both how information assets flow in the underlying IT-infrastructure and the different paths attackers can use to find their way in the infrastructure. We use information flow [11] to analyze where and "how much" critical information is located in the various parts of the the system, and a customized version of attack paths [12] to analyze how attackers with different profiles might reach this information.
CRAC is meant to support IT-enabled network of organizations, in reducing the subjectivity of the (confidentiality) risk assessment results. CRAC improves and extends our earlier work, DCRA [9] , for confidentiality risk assessments.
The underlying idea of the CRAC-method is that of linking the likelihood of loss of confidentiality of a given data asset with its "reachability" within the IT-infrastructure. This is at the same time the strength and the limitation of the method: on one hand it allows to reference the IT-infrastructure as a crucial element for assessing confidentiality risks; on the other hand it does not consider factors and risks such as insider trading. This is a design choice: CRAC can be easily integrated with other risk assessment methods and can be used as a specialized "plug in" when they need to assess the intrinsic confidentiality risks of an IT-infrastructure.
II. THE CRAC-METHOD
The CRAC-method extends the IT security related aspects of ISO/IEC 27001 [5] , by trying to assess how difficult it is for unauthorized users to access confidential information. The CRAC-method is based on two ideas. (1) Information is a logical asset, so it can flow from one component to the other one, e.g. it could flow to a component because a user copies it there. (2) An attacker may penetrate into a system through different components and follow different attack paths. CRAC analysis consists of four steps, which we now illustrate (see [10] for a more detailed description of each step and how each step is executed in two real world case studies). a)
Step 0: Collecting Basic Information: In this step we collect: (1) the list of information assets present on the system, their confidentiality level and homogeneity property; (2) the list of components that form the IT-infrastructure of the system in scope and of the links among them; (3) the list of relevant vulnerabilities; and (4) the list of possible threat agents. We adopt the following notation: L is the set of confidentiality levels; N is the set of information asset quantity classes; I is the set of single impact values; T I is the set of total impact values; P is the set of qualitative likelihood values. We call information assets the "semantic components of an information system that are required for an organization to conduct its mission or business" [7] . A is the set of information assets we consider. To each information asset a ∈ A we associate a confidentiality level l(a). C is the set of components (i.e. hardware, software or network segment) which may contain one or more instances of a given information asset a. The mapping n : A × C → N is a qualitative estimate of the number of instances of a that can be retrieved from component c at once. An information asset a is homogeneous if the damage due to its disclosure can be considered proportional to the number of its instances that get disclosed. For example "social security numbers" are homogeneous, since the damage due to the loss of one hundred social security numbers is larger than the damage due to the loss of a single social security number. Conversely, an information asset is non-homogeneous if the damage due to the disclosure of one instance is as big as the damage of the disclosure of all instances. For example, if the login credentials of one user get disclosed, the damage to the company is basically the same as if the credentials of 100 users with equal access rights would be disclosed. We model this with the mapping h : A → {homogeneous, non−homogeneous}. b)
Step 1: Analyzing Information Flow: We now analyze the logical and physical connections among components (in other words, we analyze the IT-infrastructure). Then, we determine the impact of each component by considering the information assets that may flow to it. If there is a possibility for an information asset to flow to a component then we proceed as if that information asset was actually present on that component. To model information flow we build for each information asset a a set of flow paths. A flow path is a path in the architecture graph which starts with a component where a is stored.
Definition II.1. (architecture graph) An architecture graph arch = C, E is a directed graph in which C is a set of vertices representing components and E is a set of edges E ⊆ C × C. (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ E if and only if there exists a direct connection between c 1 and c 2 such that information can flow from c 1 to c 2 or an attacker who has access to c 1 can disclose the information available on c 2 .
The nodes of a flow path represent the components in which a can be accessed by an attacker. We represent a flow path by an ordered list (with no repetitions) fp = [c 1 , . . . , c n ] where c 1 . . . c n ∈ C. We call FP a = {fp 1 , . . . , fp m } the set of flow paths of a. We use (if desired) the maximum number of instances that may flow to a component c from its connected components to determine the number of instances an attacker can disclose by gaining access to c.
After constructing the flow paths we determine for each information asset a, for each component c and for each flow path fp ∈ FP a , the number of instances of a that are present in c according to fp using the function (n : A×C ×FP a → N ). If we call index(c, fp) the index of c inside fp, then n(a, c, fp) = min i≤index(c) n(a, c i ), where c i ∈ fp.
Summarizing, fp allows us to determine how many instances of a are present on c. Now, we can determine for each a, c and fp, the impact of the disclosure of the instances of a which are present in c. The function fp uses the function (fp-imp : A × C × FP a → I), which considers the number of instances of an information asset which can be extracted to a component at once, its confidentiality level and homogeneity.
Here : L × N → I is a monotonic composition operator for the values in L and N .
should be agreed on with the risk assessment stakeholders. As we discussed before, quantitative values for the impact are difficult to obtain in practice. However, if quantitative values are available, then the operator behaves as a multiplication. Now, we are able to compute the impact of the disclosure the information asset a via component c, imp : A × C → I, as imp(c, a) = max fp∈FPa fp-imp(a, c, fp)
Summarizing, in this step we have built a set of information flow paths: one for each architecture graph, information asset, component the assets resides on and graph path. Then, we determined the impact of the leakage of the information asset stored on each component in the architecture graph.
We call total impact for component c the impact of the disclosure of all confidential information assets available on c. If c contains only one information asset a, then imp(c) = imp(c, a). On the other hand, if c contains two or more assets (say a 1 and a 2 ) then we "add" imp(c, a 1 ) and imp(c, a 2 ). To this end we use the monotone operator ⊕ : T I × I → T I. As for , ⊕ shall be agreed on with the stakeholders. More formally, the total impact of c is:
Step 2: Attack Propagation Paths: In the second step of the CRAC-method we build the Attack Propagation Paths (APPs) which describe how different threat agents may penetrate into the IT-infrastructure. Then, we determine the likelihood that a threat agent gets unauthorized access to the information available on each component. We call T the set of threat agents.
We call vulnerabilities weaknesses of the components which make attack propagation possible. We call V the set of all the vulnerabilities. We represent the fact that v is a weakness of c with a mapping w : V × C → {true, false}, and the likelihood that a threat agent t exploits a vulnerability v to compromise a component c with the mapping p : T × V × C → P .
To model confidentiality breaches we build for each threat agent t a set of APPs. The nodes of an APP represent the components that an attacker can compromise during an attack. We build each APP in two steps. We first add a node (c 1 ) to the APP for each component that can be directly reached by a threat agent (for external threat agents we can add a special component "the internet"). Second, we iteratively add new nodes and edges as follows: if node c 1 is in the architecture graph and is connected to the component c 2 , then we add c 2 to the APP. Similarly to information flow paths, we represent an APP by an ordered list app = [c 1 , . . . , c n ] where c 1 . . . c n ∈ C with no repeated occurrences of c i . We call APP t = {app 1 , . . . , app n } the set of APPs a threat agent t can follow.
We can now make an estimate of the likelihood that a threat agent t compromises each component c by following an attack propagation path in APP t . In doing so we need to consider two properties: (1) each component may have more than one vulnerability that t can exploit, in this case we assume the threat agent will exploit the vulnerability with the highest associated likelihood; and (2) if the threat agent needs to compromise other components in order to compromise c, then we assume that the likelihood of compromising c is the lowest likelihood of the list (i.e. the hardest step). Given a component c, a threat agent t, a set of vulnerabilities V , an attack path app ∈ APP t , and index(c, app) the index of c in the ordered list app, we call p : T × C × APP t → P the likelihood of t compromising c by following app where
Finally, by merging the likelihood of exploiting a component w.r.t the alternative APPs, we determine the component's reachability level.
Definition II.2. (Reachability) Given a component c, the reachability level of c reach : C → P equals to the likelihood of the APP that leads to c and is the easiest (i.e. highest likelihood) among alternative APPs that may be followed by a threat agents t. Accordingly, reach(c) = max t∈T (max app∈APPt (p(t, c, app))) In this step we combine the output of steps 1 and 2 to identify the weak spots in the system and eventually compare the security of alternative IT-infrastructures. We identify the weak spots based on their confidentiality risk.
Definition II.3. (Risk) Given a component c with total impact imp(c) and reachability level reach(c), we call the risk of c the pair risk(c) = imp(c), reach(c) .
After determining the risk of all components of each ITinfrastructure we sort them. We identify the most critical components as those components with the highest total impact and reachability level. Then we determine which infrastructure is more robust w.r.t. confidentiality risk by comparing the risk of assets on the different architectures graphs.
III. EVALUATION
According to the stakeholders a successful confidentiality risk method should satisfy the following criteria: (C1) the method should allow the risk assessor to represent the complexity of the system to be assessed in a detailed manner and is justified by the goal of the case-study stakeholders; (C2) the method should be practical to implement; and (C3) the method should deliver less subjective results. We measure how well our solution scores w.r.t. these criteria based on the following measures: (M1) the number of risk-related aspects the method is able to represent (e.g. attack propagation); (M2) the percentage of optional risk-related aspects; (M3) the percentage of aspect that can be analyzed with more detail if the system is confidentiality sensitive; and (M4) the percentage of non-subjective aspects. We measure (C1) with (M1) and (M3) and (C2) with (M2) and (M3). The goal of the stakeholders are to compare the confidentiality risks of two alternative IT-infrastructures. This requires assessing the risks of these two IT-infrastructures separately and then comparing the assessment results. Different risk assessors must be able to work on the two assessments. Therefore, the method they use must be inter-subjective (C3). Since the subjectivity of assessment depends on the subjectivity of the aspects that are used for determining the incident likelihood and impact, we measure it by the percentage of non-subjective aspects (M4).
We now compare CRAC with two risk assessment methods w.r.t. the success criteria above. The methods we consider are: a checklist based RA-method used by the auditors and the (well-known) CRAMM-method [2] . Table I reports a summary of this comparison. Regarding M1, using the CRAMM-method one is able to take into account almost twice as many aspects than with the check-list based approach and our CRACmethod. Some of the aspects that the CRAMM-method takes into account (and CRAC does not) are the number of persons using the assets, threat level and potential impact scenarios. However, there are also aspects that CRAC considers and CRAMM does not. They are information homogeneity and volume. Regarding M2, the RA-method allows one to ignore 30% more aspects than the CRAC-method and 40% more aspects than the CRAMM-method. Regarding M3, the CRACmethod considers 19% more aspects than the check-list based approach and 8% more aspects than the CRAMM-method with adjustable granularity. For instance, if the assessor wants to have a more detailed risk assessment then the CRAC-method allows the assessor to consider the number of instances of an information asset on a given component. Consequently, with the CRAC-method the risk assessor can adjust the granularity of the impact determination depending on the desired detail level of a risk assessed. Regarding M4, CRAC uses the highest percentage of non-subjective aspects. It is followed by the CRAMM-method, which uses only 6% less non-subjective aspects than CRAC. This happens because most of the information CRAC uses is either generally well-documented or previously agreed on by all stakeholders. Although, the CRACmethod considers almost the same number of aspects as the RA-method, the RA method has 15% more subjective aspects than CRAC that can be adjusted to the desired granularity at which the risk assessment is carried out. Accordingly, we argue that both the CRAC-method and the CRAMM-method represent confidentiality risks better than the RA-method.
Repeatability of CRAC depends on satisfying two assumptions: (A1) IT-architectural drawings on the system to be risk assessed are available; and (A2) for risk assessment purposes staff with good security understanding can be interviewed. Providers of outsourcing services usually have to deliver a high level IT-architectural document describing the system to be outsourced. Therefore, if applied to a case where the outsourcing provider and client are big organizations then both assumptions are fulfilled.
We interviewed our industrial partners after applying CRAC to their system. We believe that one of the reasons why we achieved good results is that the CRAC-method is specifically designed for assessing "confidentiality" risks, whereas the other methods aim to assess confidentiality, integrity, and availability risks at once. Furthermore, we developed the CRAC-method with the success criteria defined by the stakeholders in our minds, whereas CRAMM is not developed to serve the goals of the stakeholders in this case.
IV. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
In [9] we introduced the DCRA-model. CRAC improves and extends DCRA for outsourced IT-systems. In these scenarios detailed information on confidentiality aspects, e.g. volume of information stored on each component, is not explicitly available. Therefore, CRAC presents a more practical approach that systematically elicits information. Here we consider the volume of information flowing and information flow paths. Furthermore, the DCRA-method does not consider attacker profiles and to whom the information gets disclosed. These concepts become especially critical at cross-organizational cooperations. CRAC addresses these concepts by extending the DCRA-method with the concept of threat agents for attack path identification.
For confidentiality it is essential to model how information flows. In the literature we find a number of approaches for modeling security with information flow graphs, e.g. [3] , [11] , [8] . However, only Chivers [3] uses information flow trees and form attack paths for analyzing risk. The diagrams they propose however cannot be used for comparing risks of two IT-architectures.
Attack paths and attack trees are introduced by Schneier [12] and are widely used in the security literature (e.g. [4] ) to model different ways of compromising a system. In most cases, the nodes of an attack graph represent threats or vulnerabilities, as threat trees do. Our approach resembles attack threes because we model how an attack propagates. However, we carry out the propagation analysis at the IT-architecture level.
In this paper we presented the CRAC-method and how it can be used (1) as supplement to the existing risk management approaches for practically assessing confidentiality risks of an IT-system in presence of outsourcing, and (2) as a stand alone tool for comparing the security of IT-architectures w.r.t. confidentiality. The CRAC-method extends the concept of architecture-based confidentiality risk assessment in the absence of explicit information by (a) eliciting impact related information for modeling the information flow and (b) eliciting the reachability information of critical information assets by modeling "attack paths".
